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are then framed as an optimization problem to analyze the distribution of travelers’ VOT. The paper concludes by quantifying abstract
variables and solving the optimization problem, giving insight into
the use of Vickrey auction schemes for dynamic V2I tolling scenarios.

High-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes—an increasingly popular solution for
congested roadway networks—give drivers the option to access express
lanes. The cost of entry often varies with demand, although no standard
method of optimizing these price points exists. Using the principles of a
Vickrey auction that incentivizes true-value bids, this paper proposes a
tolling system that uses vehicle-to-infrastructure technology to optimize
toll operator revenue with HOT lane usage. In the scenario, a roadway
network consists of a HOT lane and a general-purpose lane, each with
identical physical properties. Drivers can access the HOT lane at the start
of the facility or at one interim point along the roadway. With the use of a
triangular distribution to approximate the distribution of travelers’ value
of time (VOT), the model explores the impact of varying the distribution’s
mode on revenue earned by the toll operator. Results from the model indicate that when the toll operator maximizes the model’s revenue, the percentage of auction bids accepted for toll road access is robust to changes
in the VOT distribution. This percentage equates to approximately 17%
of vehicles accessing the facility. Given the difficulty in obtaining actual
travelers’ distribution of VOT, this auction tolling mechanism implies that
obtaining an exact VOT distribution may not be necessary for this type
of tolling analysis.

Background
As volumes on transportation networks increase, factors such as
environmental constraints, right-of-way issues, societal impacts, and
reduced public funding limit the ability and attractiveness of reducing
congestion by constructing new roads (2). When new facility expansion and construction are not options, planners must employ alternative
strategies. One popular strategy is the use of high-occupancy vehicle
(HOV) lanes. Adopting this strategy requires at least two key components, namely, the availability of an extra lane for HOV travel and
a way to ensure optimal use of the dedicated lane. To maximize the
potential flow improvements provided by HOV lanes, some locales
expand the eligible vehicles to include hybrid electric cars and tollpaying customers. HOV lanes combined with tolls are called highoccupancy toll (HOT) lanes. The first HOT lane was implemented in
1995 on SR-91 in Orange County, California (3).
Tolling can help relieve congestion while generating funds for
transportation infrastructure improvements and is thus likely to
become more prevalent in the future. Poole points out that most major
Interstate corridors were built in the 1960s and 1970s with a 50-year
life span and are nearing the end of their expected service (4). Poole
estimates that revitalizing these roads will cost $3.14 trillion over
the next 30 years. Tolling might be the only viable means to fund
this extensive project, and thus it represents an important facet of
transportation research.
With the use of nondisruptive technology (e.g., E-ZPass) that automatically bills the toll road user and eliminates the need for stopping at
tollbooths, tolls are becoming easier and more efficient to use. Given
the developments in tolling technology and the increasing adoption
of this congestion reduction strategy, more research must investigate available tolling policies. Combining the use of mathematical
modeling of tolling mechanisms (5–8) with studies on V2I for traffic
management (9), this paper examines a scenario in which driverless
vehicles allow travelers to bid in a live auction for tolls on HOT lanes
by using V2I technology. The following sections provide explanations of current tolling mechanisms and then describe the scenario and
research methodology.

Wireless technology increasingly incorporates everyday appliances
such as televisions, refrigerators, and even doorbells. Personal vehicles are no exception to this wireless expansion, or “Internet of things,”
with companies like OnStar offering emergency and security vehicleto-infrastructure (V2I) capabilities over cellular phone networks. The
evolving nature of V2I technology expands the possibilities for new
applications, such as the participation of travelers in auctions to access
toll roads in which bids are placed via V2I devices (1). This paper con
siders such an application in a simple traffic scenario with dynamic
auction tolling. The mathematical model developed here shows the
impact of varying the distribution of travelers’ (customers’) value of
time (VOT) on overall travel time and bid acceptance policies. The
results indicate that the proposed auction mechanism is invariant to the
VOT distribution and therefore potentially allows future researchers
to reduce their concerns about obtaining an exact VOT distribution
for tolling models.
The next section gives a brief background on tolling and auctions.
An overview of transportation and revenue management theory,
which forms the backbone of this analysis, follows. These theories
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Two important elements of modeling tolls are the tolling mechanism and customer utility. The tolling mechanism has traditionally
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taken the form of a fixed cost for using the toll road; customer utility involves a VOT equation with customers’ choices modeled in a
variety of ways (3).
Traditionally, toll roads have fixed prices. One advantage to this
approach is that drivers and customers know what to expect and can
prepare for the payment amount. As nondisruptive payment methods,
such as E-ZPass, become more common, automated tolling mechanisms reduce the need for tollbooths and introduce the potential
for varying toll prices. Dynamic price points for tolls reflect preset
time intervals, such as rush hour, or real-time response to congestion. Examples of real-world dynamic tolls include the San Diego
I-15 FasTrak, which changes the toll price every 17 min during peak
periods; the Orange County, California, SR-91 tolls, which change
every hour; the Minnesota I-394 tolls, which change as frequently as
every 3 min; and the I-95 express toll lanes in Florida, which change
the toll price every 15 min (7).
An adjustable tolling mechanism allows control over the number
of vehicles using the roadway or HOT lane. Setting a toll price too
low leads to overutilization, congestion, and degradation in service
quality. Setting the price too high will discourage use and lead to
underutilization of the HOT lane and less-than-optimal congestion
relief for the general-purpose (GP) lanes. This paper contributes to
the theoretical and practical study of tolling mechanisms to ensure
that an optimal number of vehicles enter the toll lane both to relieve
congestion and to maximize revenue (6).
Literature on tolling mechanisms reveals a variety of approaches to
maximizing revenue. Cheng and Ishak developed a feedback mechanism for maximizing toll revenue while ensuring that the toll road
maintained a minimum speed of 45 mph or higher, which they tested
in a PTV VISSIM simulation (7). Zhang et al. initially followed a
similar approach (10). Subsequent research by Zhang et al. adapted
this approach to include control theory, in which a proportional integral and derivative algorithm was used to control oscillations in flows
and to make a smoother ride for toll lane users (8). Wie applied the
Stackelberg leadership model from game theory to solve dynamic toll
schedules for a specified subset of arcs with bottlenecks on a congested traffic network (5). Shepherd and Balijepalli modeled the use
of toll pricing as a means for cities in competition with one another
to attract new residents (11, 12). Their results indicated that competition resulted in unfavorable tolling strategies for both cities. Friesz
et al. presented a sophisticated method for dynamic congestion pricing; however, they faced computationally intensive and difficult
implementation (13). The problem of computational intensity, known
as the curse of dimensionality, plagues many techniques developed to
study congestion pricing. The complex nature of the studies described
here highlights the difficulty in optimizing vehicle use of the toll road.
Toll price determination usually focuses on the relationship between
customers (travelers) and toll operators. With V2I technology, the
potential exists for the toll operator to directly interface with travelers in real time in response to road conditions. The toll operator
would respond to higher or lower demand by raising or lowering the
price accordingly. Times of high volume, however, leave little room
for error in determining the toll price. Setting the price too low could
lead to congestion on the toll road beyond that of the GP lanes and, in
turn, to customer dissatisfaction. Rather than allowing the toll operator to allocate eligible access to the toll road randomly when demand
is higher than capacity, this study proposes the use of an auction to
determine which vehicles will pay what price to enter the HOT lane.
The following auction mechanism is proposed to adjust toll
amounts dynamically on the basis of travelers’ demonstrated valuation of road use provided by V2I technology by placing bids for
the maximum amount they are willing to pay to use the toll road, an
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amount roughly equivalent to their individual value of time. The toll
operator then determines a cutoff price for bids on the basis of the
number of vehicles that can be admitted to the road without exceeding desired density levels. This version of the auction mechanism
is a one-shot auction, but an auction can be run in many different
ways. [An overview of standard auction types appears in Teodorović
et al. (14) and in Dash et al. (15)]. Different auction mechanisms
will result in different revenue payouts to the auctioneer, so tolling
mechanisms should adapt to suit the needs of the specific scenario.
This research incorporates the mechanism of a Vickrey auction,
which works by allowing the auctioneer to set a cutoff for the number of winning bids and then accepting that number of the highest
bids. The final price given to the winners is equal to the highest bid
that was not accepted (or slightly above it) (16). The proxy bidding
system of the eBay website is similar to a Vickrey auction. The advantage of this auction mechanism is that it disincentivizes outbidding
behavior when auction participants attempt to cheat the system.
Instead, consumers tend to bid their perceived values of the product, leading to realistic valuation of the auction item, in this case,
toll prices. This mechanism design allows for multiple bids from
travelers but creates some challenges discussed later.
Although the Nobel Prize–winning economist Williams Vickrey
published research on both congestion pricing problems (17) and
auction theory (16) in the 1960s, he did not connect the two together
at the time. This lack of connection likely resulted from the infeasibility of bidding while driving and the lack of means to organize bid
outcomes in real time, problems that modern technology solves.
With the potential use of V2I technology and driverless vehicles,
conducting a tolling auction during transit is now feasible. Until now,
research connecting Vickrey’s two groundbreaking ideas has focused
on bidding before travel rather than bidding while traveling. For example, Teodorović et al. proposed an auction-based congestion pricing
scheme for people to bid on entry to a downtown area in a weeklong
period to which the bidders wish to make one or more visits (14). The
researchers produced a mixed-integer program problem and solved
it by using heuristics. The study did not consider V2I technology.
Recently, Zhou and Saigal considered V2I-facilitated auctions
and used a combinatorial auction approach to process bids from an
interconnected toll road network (1). Combinatorial auctions allow
bidders to bid on different or even multiple but overlapping items,
such as an interconnected toll network (18). The mechanism that
Zhou and Saigal (1) used is called the VCG named after Vickrey
(16), Clarke (19), and Groves (20). The VCG works by first deciding which bids maximize revenue and then determining the bid
price. This price is based on the difference between the revenue
gained if the bidder’s bid was accepted and the theoretical revenue
gained if the bid was not accepted (i.e., if a bid was not accepted,
then other bids might be accepted instead). The VCG approach is
very computationally intensive and is NP-hard (14).
This research connects Vickrey’s auction mechanism with V2I technology to optimize revenue and lane usage without requiring excessive
computation. This process first requires quantification of the driving
behavior factors considered to evaluate efficiency and customer satisfaction. The following section establishes the customer utility aspect
of this type of tolling mechanism.
Customer Evaluation of Time
The majority of tolling research, including this study, uses the concept of VOT for determining how much travelers are willing to
pay. VOT is a linear multiplying constant that relates time saved to
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a monetary value. The authors accept that using VOT has several
drawbacks, including that it does not take into account the complex
factors in human decision making. For example, travelers’ VOT
reflects time of day, as indicated by the VOT for the I-395 HOT lane
in Minnesota that varied from $73/h in the morning to $116/h in the
afternoon (21). Drivers also exhibit a perception bias toward tolls of
about 15 to 20 min for which they will accept an increase in travel
time to avoid a toll (22). In addition, research suggests that travelers value time savings more on longer trips (22) and that they are
willing to accept time-varying toll charges only if those charges can
yield more-reliable journey times (23). These factors could explain
why Cho et al. discovered a limited correlation between time saved
and proportion of travelers using HOT lanes (21). These human factors indicate that VOT may require the addition of a constant value.
Michalaka et al. presented more complex examinations of VOT by
using artificial intelligence techniques to learn travelers’ dynamic
VOT with data from the I-95 Express in Florida, but this issue is
beyond the scope of the current study (2).
In this model, VOT is secondary to the auction pricing mechanism,
the primary area of inquiry here. For that reason, the inability of VOT
to capture more complex human decision-making processes is outweighed by the simplicity of the approach. In this study, the heterogeneity of VOT, rather than the actual function, is the most important
aspect of this measure.
Customer Choice Models
A final aspect of consumer behavior incorporated into the model
involves determining how drivers make the choice to participate
in dynamic tolling auctions. In the literature on toll participation,
the favored approach is to use logit choice models (24) to replicate
human decision making about whether to take the toll road (7, 10).
Gardner et al. did a comparative study of customer choice models
and concluded that the Burr distribution was the best fit for customer
choice (3). The model in the current paper assumes that every traveler
has a value for the time-saving aspect of using the toll road (even if
that value is zero), so every vehicle places a bid. This feature means
that a traveler’s only choice in this model is the amount of his or her
bid, which the authors assume is based on that traveler’s VOT.
Model Design
The research presented in this paper considers a simple tolling scenario (Figure 1) to investigate the impact of assuming different estimates of VOT distribution on both the toll operator’s revenue and
the travel times of the vehicles in the system.

nodes A and C is an interchange B between the toll road and the GP
road (Figure 1). The authors assume that movement between the two
roads at the intersection is smooth and does not interfere with the
flow of traffic. All segments are identical in length and capacity. Thus,
given the same vehicle volume, travel time is the same on all road
segments. The total volume of vehicles is normalized to equal one
without loss of generality.
Unlike in traditional fixed-tolling mechanisms, travelers in this
scenario bid to use the toll road, and the toll operator determines
which bids are accepted. The travelers initially place two bids: one
for use of the toll road from A to C without interruption, b(AC), and
one for the toll road from A to B, b(AB). If a traveler’s b(AC) bid
is accepted, that traveler’s other bids are nullified. Travelers whose
initial b(AC) bids are not accepted are provided the opportunity to
bid for the BC segment; thus, three potential bidding opportunities
are available. A traveler may get to use the toll road for the complete
journey even if his b(AC) bid is rejected, as his b(AB) and b(BC)
bids might be accepted.
Toll or HOT lane operation policies may have multiple objectives.
The most common are to maximize throughput of the entire freeway
(both GP and toll lanes) and to provide free-flow traffic service on the
toll lane. The authors assume in this scenario that the toll operator’s
only objective is to maximize revenue from the tolls collected. Thus,
the operator is not concerned with minimizing overall travel time or
maximizing road efficiency.
This scenario assumes that all vehicles and toll operators have
the V2I technology required for this process to occur. In addition, it
assumes that all vehicles can place bids before reaching the selection nodes A and B and that no slowdown from a vehicle entering or
exiting a toll lane occurs. The final assumption is that all travelers
are able to honor their bids.
The following sections describe the three parts required to produce a complete toll model: the link travel time function, the bidding
mechanism, and the customer’s VOT.
Link Travel Time Function
As VOT is directly related to bids placed by travelers, the time
required to transverse the network and the effects of congestion are
critical. The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads uses a standard equation
for congestion on road segments, shown in Equation 1, the use of
which is also supported by Teodorović et al. (14). This equation is
based on Greenshields’s fundamental diagram of traffic flow (25):
4


 v  
t (l , v ) = tff (l )  1 + 0.15 
 c (l )  


(1)

where

Scenario
The scenario involves a single origin–destination pair, AC, connected by a GP road and a toll road. At the midway point between

t = travel time of link l for traffic volume v,
tff = free-flow travel time, and
c = road segment capacity.
Justified by its acceptance in congestion and tolling studies, this
equation will also inform model development for this study.
Bidding Mechanism

FIGURE 1   Node–arc diagram of
scenario transportation network.

Because the entire bidding process in this scenario occurs over
wireless V2I technology, this system has two decision makers, the
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b ( AB, x ) = u ( x ) ( t ( ABGP , v ( ABGP )) − t ( ABtoll , v ( ABtoll )))

1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

(2)

where x is the traveler and u is the VOT. The advantage of using
this bidding equation is that it stops the scenario when the toll operator simply accepts all bids. Such a condition would make the toll
road’s congestion worse than that of the GP lane and lead travelers
to bid zero.
b( AC, x ) = b( AB, x ) + b( BC, x )

2
Probability Density Function

traveler and the toll operator. Equations 2 and 3 represent the decisions of travelers. The decision of the toll operator is discussed in
the section on the model. On the basis of individual VOT, travelers
will place bids for access to toll road segments. The authors assume
that travelers have perfect knowledge about travel time on the road
segments and are thus able to determine the travel time savings of
using the toll road. The justification for this perfect knowledge is
the assumption that regularly commuting travelers along the road
would likely be able to make accurate estimates of travel time on the
basis of current conditions. By using a Vickrey auction mechanism,
travelers lack incentive to bid anything other than their true estimates of the toll price. From these assumptions, the bidding formula
for travelers for arc AB in Equation 2 is based on the difference in
travel times between the GP and the toll lanes:

(3)

A variation of Equation 2 can also be used for bids of the BC road
segment. Determining bids for using the toll road all the way from A
to C, b(AC), is trickier because it involves multiple road segments
(Equation 3). The authors assume that this bid considers only travel
time savings and therefore means that it relates to Equation 2. This
estimate of the AC bid may be problematic and will be discussed in
the section on results.
Travelers’ VOT Distribution
The model assumes that travelers propose heterogeneous bids; other
wise, everyone would bid the same amount. Here a method for
modeling travelers’ VOT is established. This step means that each
traveler will have a different VOT defined as u(x) in Equation 2.
Thus, the distribution of the traveler’s VOT needs to be defined.
Without any estimate of the distribution of VOT, the model leans
toward parsimony and applies a simple triangular distribution. The
triangular distribution allows the setting of a minimum VOT (i.e.,
zero) and a maximum VOT (as even billionaires have limits on their
VOT). Unlike the uniform distribution, the triangular distribution also
allows the setting of an average, the mode. Then this mode can be
varied to produce different distributions (Figure 2). Other functions,
like the beta function, achieve this variability but require more complex implementation. The triangular function is used in other transportation models as an approximation of relationships like flow to
density (2). Because the function is continuous, the authors assume
that the number of vehicles is continuous and not discrete. To simplify
the mathematics, the number of vehicles is normalized to one.

Here the model is developed that helps the second set of decision
makers, the toll operators, who decide which bids to accept given
the travelers’ bidding strategies discussed earlier. Because of the
structure of Vickrey auctions, the accepted price for toll road access

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

VOT
FIGURE 2   Various versions of triangular distribution with
minimum of zero and maximum of one.

is the value of the lowest accepted bid—or highest nonaccepted
bid in the continuous case. The toll operator then faces a dilemma:
as more vehicles are accepted, the number of payments collected
increases, but the toll price for each is lower. The toll operator must
balance the number of vehicles accepted against the actual toll price
paid. In addition, the more vehicles that are accepted onto the toll
road, the less attractive it is to drivers (more vehicles mean slower
travel times), so they will lower their initial bids. The toll operator
must consider these factors to maximize toll revenue.
The toll operator must make three decisions:
• The number of bids to accept for use of the entire length of the
toll road, b(AC);
• The number of bids to accept for only the first toll segment,
b(AB); and
• The number of bids to accept for only the last toll segment, b(BC).
The authors assume that the toll operator takes the highest bids
available for each segment and that the operator prefers bids for
b(AC) over those for b(AB), as more guaranteed revenue is generated. From these assumptions the following optimization problem
is developed:
umax

max θ ,µ ,λ∈[0,1]
F

∫(

−1

b ( AC, F −1 (1 − λ )) f ( x ) dx

1−λ )

−1

F (1−λ )

+
F

−1

∫(

(1− θ+λ ))

F −1 (1−λ )

+

∫

F −1 (1−(µ+λ ))

such that
Model

0.2

θ + λ ≤1
and
µ + λ ≤1

b ( AB, F −1 (1 − (θ + λ ))) f ( x ) dx
b ( BC, F −1 (1 − (µ + λ ))) f ( x ) dx

(4)
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where
λ
θ
µ
F

= proportion of travelers whose b(AC) bid is accepted,
= proportion of travelers whose b(AB) bid is accepted,
= proportion of travelers whose b(BC) bid is accepted,
=	cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the triangular
distribution,
f =	probability distribution function (PDF) of the triangular
distribution,
umax = upper bound of the triangular distribution, and
umod = distribution’s mode.
The vehicles are identified by their associated VOT; thus, u(x) = x
here; because the vehicles are represented as continuous variables,
their VOTs are unique. The constraints ensure that no more vehicles
are allocated to the arc ABtoll and BCtoll than the number of vehicles in
the system (which was normalized to one). The three integrals show
the total revenue generated from the three groups: those accepted for
travel on the complete toll road and those accepted for travel on only
one of the two segments. The price paid by each vehicle in a particular
group is constant and is equal to the lowest bid offered for that group.
Thus, the equation can be simplified to the following:
max λb ( AC, F (1 − λ )) + θb ( AB, F
−1

θ ,µ ,λ∈[ 0,1]

−1

Under these constraints, one side of the triangular distribution needs
to be considered. Thus
F −1 (1 − x ) = umax − x i umax (umax − umod )
This arrangement means that the new constraints become

(θ + λ ) ≤

µ max − umod
umax

(µ + λ ) ≤

µ max − umod
umax

+ µb ( BC, F

(9)

Substituting Equation 8 into Equation 6 results in the following
optimization problem, with the constraints above:
 (θ + λ ) umax − umax(umax −umod )    (1 − (θ + λ ))4  
 
max θ ,µ ,λ∈[0,1] 0.15 

 λ 1 − λ + θ 1 − (θ + λ )    − (θ + λ )4  

(

)

 (µ + λ ) umax − umax(umax −umod )    (1 − (µ + λ ))4  
 
+ 0.15 

 λ 1 − λ + µ 1 − (µ + λ )    − (µ + λ )4  

(

(1 − (θ + λ )))
−1

(8)

)

(10)

(1 − (µ + λ )))

(5)
Results

(((1 − (θ + λ)) − (θ + λ) )) + 0.15(λF (1 − λ)
+ µF (1 − (µ + λ ))) (((1 − (µ + λ )) − (µ + λ ) ))
4

−1

4

−1

4

4

(6)

Equation 6 reduces the number of additive parts of Equation 5
from three to two; this reduction occurs because of the relation of
the bids given in Equation 3. At this stage, Equation 6 could use any
probability distribution for the travelers’ VOT. The final stage of the
manipulation of the optimization equation is to substitute the tri
angular distribution into it. The triangular distribution’s cumulative
distribution function is continuous but involves different functional
parts for each side of the mode value. To keep the equations simple,
the following are assumed:
F −1 (1 − (θ + λ )) ≥ umod
F −1 (1 − (µ + λ )) ≥ umod

(7)

20

2.5

18
16

2.0

14
12

1.5

10
8

1.0

6

λ+θ
λ
Revenue

4
2

0.5

0

0.0
0

Revenue per Vehicle
(as % of maximum VOT for 1-h saving)

max 0.15 ( λF −1 (1 − λ ) + θF −1 (1 − (θ + λ )))

θ ,µ ,λ∈[ 0,1]

The equation was numerically solved by using the NMaximize function in Mathematica 10 (www.wolfram.com/mathematica/), which
was set at a precision of five significant figures of accuracy. The
NMaximize function runs various heuristic methods to find the solution to the level of accuracy required. These methods include simulated annealing (26) and the Nelder–Mead method (27). Using this
heuristic, the authors explored the effects of varying the VOT tri
angular distribution on model results. This exploration was achieved
by varying the umod value from 0.0 to 0.9. The results are shown in
Figure 3. Several aspects of the results are noteworthy and will be
discussed in turn.
Percentage of Vehicles Accepted on Toll Road

Before the optimization equation is further manipulated, some
simplifying assumptions are made. The authors have assumed that
all the arcs are identical, and the free-flow travel is normalized
to get Tff{•} = 1. The travel time equation requires the volume of
traffic, which is assumed to be just the proportion of vehicles that
use that particular arc. This assumption means that discrete traffic
flow is also assumed as is the fact that the number of vehicles is
continuous. Further assumed is that capacity is c{•} = 1, which
means that no arc can have more than the full capacity of vehicles
flowing through it. On the basis of these assumptions, Equation 5
becomes the following:

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Mode

FIGURE 3   Graph showing results from varying mode value of
VOT distribution for both revenue generated and proportion of
vehicles allowed on toll road.
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Varying the umod value produces very different distributions. For
example, the triangular distribution with a umod = 0.9 is the opposite (mirror image) of one with a umod = 0.1. Given these differences, the numerical solutions showed surprisingly similar results,
except for umod > 0.8. The argument solution to all these cases
was approximately λ = 0.076, θ = 0.095, µ = 0.095 with a revenue
generated of 0.02. The argument solutions translate to the percentage of vehicles allowed on the toll road, which is approximately
17% on both toll segments. The revenue is a little more complex to
understand and requires an explicit example: consider a situation
in which each toll segment takes a half hour to travel at free-flow
speed and maximum VOT is $100/h saved. Then the revenue generated per 6,000 vehicles entering the system (either on the toll road
or the GP lanes) is $12,000 (by assuming that capacity is greater
than 6,000 vehicles), with an average charge of approximately $11
per vehicle.
The trend does not continue for umod > 0.8 because of an analytical
limitation placed on the model. The authors assumed (to simplify the
equations) that only vehicles whose VOT > umod would be considered
for acceptance, an assumption that resulted in some constraints given
in Equation 9. When umod < 0.8, these constraints hold for the optimal
solution; however, as umod increases beyond this point, these constraints limit the number of vehicles whose bids can be accepted and
thus result in a reduction in overall revenue and number of vehicles
accepted.
It might have been expected that the toll operator would only
accept AC bids and not any bids from AB or BC. However, accepting bids from both groups allows the toll operator to get a higher
toll price for the AC group (in accordance with the Vickrey auction
mechanism) in addition to the revenue generated by the AB and BC
groups. Thus, the toll operator can charge more to those willing to
pay more for complete access to both toll road segments as well as
make money from secondary customers. This strategy is quite common in airline pricing, for which a large difference usually exists
between the price of a business class ticket and an economy class
ticket (24).
For all umod, θ = µ, which implies that the same group of vehicles
gets accepted on the toll road from AB as those on the toll road from
BC, thus effectively getting the same benefit as those whose AC bids
were accepted. This result is unsurprising, as the selection situation
is the same for both AB and BC: the toll and GP lanes are exactly the
same; the number of vehicles on the toll is the same (from those who
have been selected from the AC bids); and the bids are exactly the
same (as it is the same group of travelers remaining in both cases).
However, the first group pays 80% of the maximum bid, and the
second group pays 70% of the maximum; thus, the group guaranteed
complete access to the two toll road segments pays a 10% premium.
This result could lead to complications from a game theory point of
view because the top percentage of travelers would benefit from not
bidding on the AC option. However, all travelers accepted on the toll
road pay less than their VOT saved, so they would still benefit from
the current arrangement.
Given that θ = µ means that λ + θ = λ + µ, only one of these values is shown in Figure 3. The graph shows a slight increase in the
percentage of vehicles accepted to use the toll road as umod increases.
As umod increases the traveler’s willingness to accept a higher price
increases, so one might expect more vehicles to be accepted on
the toll road, and they are. However, acceptance of more vehicles
slows the travel time and reduces the benefit of the toll road.
This change motivates those travelers with a higher VOT to sub-
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mit lower bids. This trade-off forces the toll operator to perform,
because of the changing bids, a balancing act between the number of cars accepted on the toll road and the amount of potential
revenue per car.
With approximately 17% of vehicles using the toll road, travel
time reaches just over free-flow speed (i.e., 1.00004), whereas the
GP lane users see a 70% increase in travel time because of congestion. For the hour journey of the hypothetical scenario, these
differences mean that the toll users save 42 min for about $11.
A noticeable feature of Figure 3 is the invariance of the results—in
both accepted toll users and in revenue obtained by the toll operator—
to extreme changes in the VOT distribution. An approximate 10%
increase remains in both accepted toll users and revenue obtained
between the extremes, results that are expected (if users have a lower
average VOT lower revenues would be expected). At this stage of the
research, the authors are not sure whether the phenomenon represents
reality or is a consequence of the model assumptions (e.g., the use of
a triangular distribution, which is inherently linear, like the observed
increase in revenues). Further research is needed to determine the
robustness of this observation to varying modeling assumptions and
comparison with real-world data.
Discussion of Application
The discussion so far has been academic in nature and, as such,
has not considered the practical limitations of implementing such
a toll auction mechanism. Four practical limitations come to
mind: education, participation rates, perception, and the dead-fish
fallacy.
Existing variable tolling mechanisms may be more intuitive than
the one proposed here. Though the proposed bidding mechanism
is simpler than other auction types, it is still a combinatorial auction and its mechanics might be beyond the grasp of the general
population. From a practical perspective, the traveler must understand that multiple bids happen simultaneously and correspond
only to a certain segment or segments of the roadway network. In
addition, placing a bid does not guarantee acceptance to the toll
road, as only the selected top bidders gain access. In addition to
the ubiquitous spread of V2I technology that would be required
to implement this proposed tolling mechanism, the toll operator
would likely need to pursue an extensive advertising and public
relations campaign before deployment.
The current model assumes 100% participation rates, which are
highly unlikely among the general population, especially for those
with a low VOT. In practice, the V2I technology and tolling mechanism would need a component to allow for default bid values.
These values would allow travelers to set a very minimal bid that
they are always willing to pay for use of the toll road. The current
optimization model does not account for this option. The impact of
default bids on an auction-based tolling mechanism is an area for
further study.
An auction-based system for HOT lanes could result in negative
public perception. Ethical considerations for who has access to the
toll or which bids are accepted constitute a hurdle for HOT implementation in general. Given that accepted bids reflect the highest
losing bid, uninformed travelers may be skeptical of the method for
selecting winning bids as prices constantly vary.
The authors’ final concern is that this system assumes a steady
state because the drivers in the scenario have both perfect knowledge
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and a constant VOT that is not affected by the system. The authors
specifically made these assumptions to explore the mathematical
theorizing of a Vickrey auction tolling system, but they do not
reflect real-world human dynamics that are constantly in flux.
Salt calls this the dead-fish fallacy, which highlights the idea that,
despite the nonstatic, dynamic nature of the world, scientists insist
on assuming static behavior (28). This assumption has consequences
on the results drawn: experimental, observational, or both. To illustrate this, Salt colorfully draws a parallel by noting that the only time
that fish remain static in a pond is when they are all dead. In the case
of a Vickrey auction tolling mechanism, the authors submit to the
dead-fish fallacy to assume that a steady state is an approximation
for the long-term behavior of the tolling system but not for the initial implementation term. Finally, the authors assume that travelers’
VOTs are not affected by the system, an assumption that may be
unreasonable in the real world. For example, if a traveler is willing
to pay $10 to use a toll road, but the final price consistently falls to
$1, then might that traveler question why his or her VOT is so high?
The market itself, and people’s own social networks, influence their
VOT and may bring the overall revenue potential down (29). As
technology advances to make the proposed tolling mechanism more
feasible, more research is required to address these limitations and
account for human heterogeneity of VOT and decision criteria to
ensure optimal revenue and lane usage.
Conclusions
This paper describes and models a tolling scenario in which automotive travelers use V2I technology to participate in a Vickrey auction for access to the toll–HOT lane. Access to the toll road occurs
at multiple points along the single facility, and travelers are able to
make multiple bids to gain access to all or parts of the toll lane. The
paper uses this model to explore the impact of varying the distribution of travelers’ VOT on the revenue achieved by the toll operator. This VOT was approximated with a triangular distribution for
which mode value was the independent variable. The results indicate robustness of the auction mechanism design to variation in the
distribution of travelers’ VOT. This variation affected the revenue
obtained by the toll operator and the number of vehicles accepted
on the toll road, which was about 17% of the total vehicles entering
the system.
The advantage of using V2I tolling is that the toll operator can
dynamically adjust the toll price to ensure full utilization of the
toll road. In the model here, however, road utilization maximizes
the toll operators’ revenue without necessarily attempting to provide the best option for travelers. The socially optimal solution, in
average travel time, would be to allow equal numbers of cars on
the toll lane as the GP lane. Doing so would remove the benefit of
using the toll lane over the GP lane and would thus disincentivize
bidding and reduce the toll operator’s revenue to zero. Therefore,
an incentive exists for the toll operator to keep the GP lane congested, a practice that follows the old business adage of creating
demand for one’s product. Because travelers bid on use of the
toll road, their doing so means that their satisfaction with the toll
operator’s acceptance strategy is implicitly included in their bid.
This system keeps the toll operator interested only in the paying
travelers. Those who win the Vickrey auction are the ones with the
highest VOT (i.e., the richest). This system therefore leads to some
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embedded socioeconomic inequalities that surface through the use
of this tolling strategy.
If this proposed system is any reflection of reality, then its
invariance to the population’s distribution of VOT indicates that
auction-based tolling could be an unnecessary mechanism because
the population makeup and preferences have very little effect on
the outcome. Traditional dynamic tolling mechanisms possibly
perform at least as well as the Vickrey auction version, but further
research is required to determine whether the model results presented
here truly reflect reality.
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